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EU Blue Economy Observatory

Marine non-living resources

Table 1:  Marine non-living resources activities based on SBS data (NACE Rev. 2.0 – Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Union. )

Sector  Sub-sector  Activity  
Marine non-living resourcesOil and gas
  • Extraction of crude petroleum
  • Extraction of natural gas
  • Support activities for petroleum and natural gas extraction
Other minerals
  • Operation of gravel and sand pits; mining of clays and kaolin
  • Extraction of salt
  • Support activities for other mining and quarrying
 Desalination
  • Desalination

  More methodological details are available on the EU Blue Economy Observatory's dedicated section.

Main sources of salt production by evaporation, Europe (left); Top five European sea salt producing countries (right)
Fig. 1 Main sources of salt production by evaporation, Europe (left); Top five European sea salt producing countries (right)

 

Extraction of other minerals

The extraction of minerals from EU seas and seabed is a significant industry, with various activities taking place across the region. The market can be broadly segmented into three main categories: gravel and sand pits, mining of clays, and deep seabed mining for other minerals.

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Until robust scientific evidence is found to demonstrate that deep seabed mining activities will not harm marine biodiversity or ecosystem health, the Commission has called for a ban on deep-sea mining. The Commission’s position on deep-sea mining is spelled out in the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 and in the International Ocean Governance Agenda. As specified in the 2022 Joint CommunicationSetting the course for a sustainable blue planet — Joint Communication on the EU’s International Ocean Governance agenda', the Commission will continue to advocate for prohibiting deep-sea mining until:

  • Scientific gaps are properly filled,
  • It can be demonstrated that no harmful effects arise from mining and,
  • As required under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the necessary provisions in the exploitation regulations for the effective protection of the marine environment are in place. 

This position is also reflected in Recital 18 of the regulation (EU) 2024/1252 on critical raw materials: ‘In line with the precautionary principle, the Commission should not recognise deep sea mining projects as Strategic Projects before the effects of deep-sea mining on the marine environment, biodiversity and human activities are sufficiently researched, the risks are understood and technologies and operational practices are capable of demonstrating that the environment is not seriously harmed.’

Concurrently, the European Parliament’s stance on deep-seabed mining is in favour of an international moratorium. In line with this precautionary principle, the Parliament urged Member States to ensure that any attempts to circumvent ISA’s jurisdiction are rejected, in line with UNCLOS obligations.

The importance of this position was reaffirmed by the Presidency of the Council of the EU on the occasion of the Ocean Pact side event at the 2025 UN Ocean Conference in June 2025.

To date, seven EU Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and numerous non‑EU countries, NGOs (e.g., IUCN), financial institutions, and corporations have called for a precautionary pause or total ban on deep‑sea mining. The UN Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP-FI) warns that financing such activities cannot meet Sustainable Blue Economy Finance Principles, urging reliance on recycling, circular‑economy measures, material substitutes and demand‑reduction policies. In line with this approach, the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the “extraction of mineral deposits from the deep sea” from the list of activities that can be financed.

Outside the EU, recent activity in deep‑sea mining can be summarized as follows:

  • By mid‑2025 the International Seabed Authority (ISA) had issued 31 active 15‑year exploration licences covering polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt‑rich ferromanganese crusts to 22 contractors from both state and private sectors, including island nations, India and China.
  • In 2024, Norway decided to open 280 000 km² of its Arctic continental shelf to mineral exploration. But following protests and intense budget negotiations, in December 2025 the government decided to halt the issuance of any deep-sea mining licences until at least the end of 2029 and to cut funding for environmental mapping of seabed minerals.
  • The “two‑year rule” invoked by Nauru in 2021 permits any ISA contractor to lodge an exploration or exploitation request, increasing pressure on the ISA to clarify how such applications will be processed. 

In 2025 India signed a new ISA exploration contract for polymetallic sulphides on the Carlsberg Ridge, signalling renewed interest in massive seafloor sulphide deposits. Concurrently, the United States has moved to accelerate seabed‑mining authorisation through domestic legislation: The Metals Company (TMC) has launched a combined exploration‑and‑recovery application under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, while still operating under existing ISA exploration contracts sponsored by Nauru and Tonga. 

These recent developments illustrate the growing tension between unilateral national approaches to accessing deep‑sea mineral resources and multilateral regulation centred on the ISA. 

The EU stance cited above—calling for improved understanding and certainty about the impacts before any further deep‑sea activities are carried out—extends beyond EU waters; it represents the Union’s broader vision for the whole ocean, as outlined in the International Ocean Governance Agenda.

In this connection, the EU co-funded ARCTICMINER project is assessing how deep‑sea mining on the Norwegian continental shelf complies with international obligations under the UNCLOS and the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction Agreement. The project seeks to reconcile coastal states’ rights with those of the international community and to determine whether recent legal developments necessitate adjustments to state practices.

Another EU co-funded project, OCEAN‑MINeD project is analysing how the ocean’s dynamics change when mineral extraction reaches its depths. While social research examines the political and environmental facets of deep‑sea mining, OCEAN‑MINeD addresses a vital gap by probing the ocean’s complex dimensions. The project is set to study resource management, technology and offshore operations.


 

 

 

 

 

 

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Oil extraction: Despite the growing role of gas and the ongoing transition to renewable sources, oil continues to play an instrumental role in the EU energy economy, particularly in sectors such as transport, the petrochemical industry and port logistics chains. However, structural data and projections by official bodies confirm a sustained decline in the weight of crude oil within the European energy system.

Crude oil production in the EU reached an all-time low in 2023: 15.5 million tonnes (Mt), compared to a peak of 41.7 Mt in 2004, representing a cumulative fall of nearly 63%[16]. Italy (4.2 Mt), Denmark (2.9 Mt) and Romania (2.9 Mt) account for most of the production, mainly in offshore fields. Similar production levels were registered in 2024, with a 3.2% increase in production by Italy, a 1.2% increase by Denmark, and a 4.4% decrease by Romania (see Figure 3). 

The overall declining trend is due to both resource depletion and a reduction in exploratory investment, in line with climate targets and environmental, social and governance (ESG) policies. Crude oil production in the EU is expected to continue declining, focusing on extending the life of mature fields, without significant new offshore developments planned for the 2025–2028 period[17].

 The EU's energy dependence on oil and petroleum products, natural gas and solid fossil fuels remained high in 2024, at approximately 67%. In 2024, the shares of different energy sources in the gross available energy varied considerably among EU countries:

  • petroleum products in available energy was highest in Cyprus (86%), Malta (85%) and Luxembourg (60%)
  • natural gas was a significant energy source in Italy (36%), the Netherlands (31%), Hungary and Ireland (both 29%)
  • solid fuels was highest in Estonia (50%), Poland (34%) and Czechia (26%)
  • renewables was highest in Sweden (48%), Latvia (46%) and Denmark (43%)
  • nuclear energy accounted for 40% of energy available in France, Slovakia (30%) and Sweden (26%).

The EU produced 43% of its own energy, while 57% was imported [18].

Crude oil imports amounted to 471.5 Mt (-1.7% compared to 2022), well below the pre-pandemic level (507.2 Mt in 2019). The main suppliers were the United States (67.2 Mt), Norway (65.6 Mt), Kazakhstan (44.6 Mt) and Iraq (35.8 Mt). Imports of oil and petroleum products from Russia decreased by 83.7%[19]

The war in Ukraine and the launch of the REPowerEU plan in 2022 significantly altered the pattern of crude oil imports in the European Union by reducing its dependency on Russian fossil fuels. Purchases from Russia fell by 24.6 Mt in 2022 and by 74.1 Mt in 2023. The decrease of crude oil import from Russia was compensated by increased imports from the United States (+18.9 Mt), Norway (+11.5 Mt) and Kazakhstan (+8.4 Mt). In recent years imports from Norway are gradually increasing. In 2023, they increased by 21.3% compared with the previous year. Imports of crude oil from the USA were historically almost irrelevant but have been increasing sharply in the last few years. They jumped 33.6% in 2020, another 28.5% in 2022 and again by 39.1% in 2023 reaching the record high and making this country the top provider to the EU[20]. This diversification has reinforced the role of transatlantic and Mediterranean maritime routes, with logistical impacts on key ports such as Rotterdam, Trieste, Marseille and Algeciras[21].


Gas extraction: Since 2021, gas demand in the EU has decreased by around 15% due to the advance of renewables, electrification of residential heating, and improvements in energy efficiency. Despite this structural decline, gas is still needed as a flexible back-up source for power generation and as an indispensable input in industrial sectors that are difficult to decarbonise, such as chemicals, metallurgy, and cement[22]. In 2025, natural gas continues to play a key role in the European energy system, albeit in a scenario marked by a transition to more sustainable sources.

Natural gas reserves in the EU are estimated at 694 billion cubic metres (bcm). 90% of these reserves are held by six Member States (Figure 4): the Netherlands (25%), followed by Romania (21.2%), Poland (15.4%), Germany (10.2%), Italy (8.9%), and Denmark (8.3%)[23].

In 2024, the EU produced 37.2 bcm of natural gas, i.e. 38% of what was produced a decade earlier (2015, 97.8 bcm). Main producers were the Netherlands (10 bcm, 26.9%), Romania (9.3 bcm, 24.9%), Poland (5.1 bcm, 13.8%), Germany (4.2 bcm, 11.3%) and Italy (2.6 bcm, 7%)[24].

Active offshore licenses (left) and pipelines (right), 2024
Figure 5. Active offshore licenses (left) and pipelines (right), 2024

With domestic gas reserves declining, imports have rapidly increased in recent years, leading to higher dependency and a pressing need to ensure supply security.

The EU remains highly dependent on gas imports, with roughly 88 % of its gas supply in 2024 sourced through four principal pipeline corridors and a series of LNG terminals:

  • Eastern corridors – pipelines that transport gas from Russia via Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey.
  • North Sea corridors – routes delivering gas from Norway and the United Kingdom.
  • Southern corridors – pipelines connecting the EU with supplies from the Caspian Sea, notably Azerbaijan.
  • North‑African corridors – infrastructure bringing gas from Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.

In addition, the EU currently operates about 33 large‑scale LNG import terminals, located on both onshore and offshore sites along its coastlines[25].

In August 2024, Eni announced the beginning of gas production from the Argo Cassiopeia field in the Strait of Sicily. With reserves estimated in the range of 10 bcm of gas, gas extraction from the Argo Cassiopeia field is expected to reach 1.5 bcm per year. The installation aims to achieve carbon neutrality for Scope 1 and 2 emissions with renewable solar energy[26].

The redesign of the European gas supply system represents one of the most significant structural transformations in the post-2022 period. Following the invasion of Ukraine and the political commitment to gradually reduce dependence on Russian gas, the EU has strengthened its gas infrastructure through strategic projects supported, among others, by the Connecting Europe Facility instrument[27]. Four alternative routes to the Ukrainian transit corridor – the Baltic Pipe, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) extension, the Trans‑Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) second‑stage expansion, and the Euro‑Baltic Interconnector – have been commissioned to ensure the continent’s energy supply security[28].

Gas storage continues to play a crucial role in absorbing market shocks, mitigating seasonal demand fluctuations, and guaranteeing supply during winter-peak consumption periods. In October 2023, total EU gas storage reached a level of 96% of total capacity, also thanks to the Demand Reduction Regulation, which has been exceeded by most Member States through voluntary curtailment measures[29].

Interactions with other sectors
  • Maritime transport and ports: These sectors play a key support role for the oil and gas industry. Not only are they responsible for the logistics of the sector, but they also provide maintenance, and will play a main role in decommissioning stages, requiring greater shore-based facilities. Oil and gas also impact these sectors by establishing exclusion safety zones around their infrastructure and activity zones, impacting transport routes. Also, LNG serves as a transition fuel for vessels, cleaner than diesel and meeting current IMO emission standards. While not a definitive solution, it is helping alleviate carbon emissions while green fuels like e-methanol or e-ammonia reach technological and availability levels that allow their use for full-scale commercial operations.
  • Pipelines and cables: the oil and gas industry is one of the main users of pipeline infrastructure. New extractive infrastructure and activities, also for other non-living resources, must consider existing pipelines and cables and ensure that they are not affected.
  • Fishing: the extraction of non-living resources has a major impact on fishing activities. During operations and infrastructure decommissioning, fishing vessels must respect at minimum a 500 metre safety zone, with additional areas during the installation of pipelines. Also, operation activities can discharge contaminants in ecosystems, like crude or contaminated water, and the effect on noise and vibration is still under study.
  • Aquaculture: In spaces with available resources for both sectors, both activities are excluded. Co-location might be a future opportunity for these spaces, although technological and legal barriers must be first addressed, especially in the case of decommissioned structures.
  • Offshore energy: While both sectors are competing for suitable space, there is potential for the installation of offshore energies infrastructure in decommissioned structures, and possible synergies with operating ones, providing access to the electrical grid, and maintenance/logistical support.
  • Conservation: The sector poses high ecological risks due to possible oil spills, ecological interactions during exploration, and noise pollution. Nevertheless, there is potential to provide protected spaces around the infrastructure, especially decommissioned structures, that can act as artificial reefs.
  • Research and innovation: the sector is highly dependent upon new technologies that allow further exploitation of existing resources under controlled operational costs. It is estimated that around 50% of newly discovered deposits are in the deep-water (between 400 and 1,500 metres) and ultra-deep-water (more than 1,500 metres) range.
  • Infrastructure and robotics: Robotics have high potential in the fields of exploitation and maintenance. Oil and gas deposits are exploring the development of subsea completion systems, deployed in the seabed, and managed by underwater robots. These systems are particularly beneficial for deep-water exploitation, as they reduce the need for offshore infrastructure, minimising environmental impacts and costs. Projects like the Chaintest, which received EU funding under the SME-FP6 programme, employ robots to reduce operational costs, such as one crawling along the chains anchoring platforms to the seabed, performing inspection and maintenance activities. Robotics also play a key part in the possible advance of seabed mining, providing selective and non-intrusive exploitation techniques. As an example of this, the EU funded ROBUST project advanced the development of an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle that can hover over the seabed, produce 3-D maps, and analyse resources, using laser technology.

Update: 21.05.2026